From Cabazon to IGRA: The Legal Framework and Sovereignty of Tribal Gaming

The California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) decision was the catalyst for the creation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1988), which Congress passed to regulate tribal gaming. This case reinforced the tribes’ right to conduct gaming without state interference, laying the groundwork for IGRA (1988).

Before the Cabazon decision, the Supreme Court had ruled in cases like Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) that states did not have regulatory authority over tribes in civil matters. This precedent was key in the Cabazon ruling, which held that if states permitted certain gaming activities for charities, tribes were entitled to engage in gaming on tribal land without state control. Congress responded to this ruling by enacting IGRA (1988), intending to balance state, federal, and tribal interests.

Congress passed IGRA in 1988, establishing a regulatory framework for tribal gaming with three classes of gaming. According to the lectures, Class I gaming involved “…traditional games that tribes had played for eons…” Class II gaming allowed tribes to operate bingo and card games without state involvement, while Class III gaming required state-tribal compacts.

IGRA (1988) was intended to promote tribal economic development while maintaining some level of state oversight over casino-style games. By requiring compacts for Class III gaming, Congress sought to ensure that states had input in the regulation of high-stakes gambling. However, this compact requirement has been a point of contention, as it sometimes allows states to extract unfavorable terms from tribes, limiting their autonomy, at times even through exceedingly punitive means.

Critics argue that IGRA (1988)’s requirement for state compacts undermines tribal sovereignty by giving states too much influence over gaming operations.

While the compact requirement can limit tribal autonomy, IGRA (1988) overall provided tribes with significant opportunities for economic growth through Class II gaming, which does not require state involvement. Additionally, IGRA (1988) seeks to respect tribal sovereignty by allowing tribes to operate gaming under federal oversight through the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) (Rand, K. R. L. & Light, S. L., 2019, pp. 7-8).

Congress executed its trust responsibility to tribes through IGRA (1988) by providing a regulatory framework that promotes economic development while ensuring public safety. However, the requirement for state-tribal compacts for Class III gaming continues to be a point of tension that limits full tribal sovereignty in gaming matters.

Only federally recognized tribes with jurisdiction over their land are eligible to operate gaming under IGRA (1988). This right to operate gaming is based on the sovereignty of tribal nations over their territories. 

The distinction between Class II and Class III gaming is central to IGRA (1988). Class II games, such as bingo, are regulated primarily by tribes and the NIGC while Class III games, like blackjack and slot machines, require state compacts.

Class II games are non-banked games where players compete against each other, not against the house. States have no claim to revenue from Class II gaming, and tribes are free to use technological advancements to enhance these games.

The ability to operate Class II gaming without state interference is a significant benefit for tribes. Class III gaming, however, involves more complex negotiations with states, as these games resemble traditional casino-style gambling, which states may regulate more heavily (Lecture 5, 15:48-16:02). Tribes such as the Pequot in Connecticut were able to negotiate successful revenue-sharing agreements with their states for Class III gaming, highlighting the economic potential of these compacts.

Some argue that the distinction between Class II and Class III games creates unnecessary complexity and limits tribes’ ability to fully benefit from gaming revenue.

Despite these challenges, the distinction between Class II and Class III games allows tribes to engage in gaming without the need for state approval in many cases. Additionally, technological advancements in Class II gaming have allowed tribes to generate significant revenue without having to rely on Class III gaming compacts.

Tribes retain substantial control over Class II gaming, allowing them to generate revenue independently from state involvement. While Class III gaming requires compacts, Class II games provide tribes with a significant economic opportunity to support their communities. For example, tribes such as the Cherokee Nation have used revenue from gaming to fund a large-scale healthcare industry, economic development projects, and education programs, demonstrating the positive impact of tribal gaming on community development.

Reference:

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) 

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1988)

Rand, K. R. L. & Light, S. L. (2019). Indian gaming law: Cases and materials. Carolina Academic Press. 

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